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Abstract
The aim of this research was to explore the rather undocumented world of the wider
policing community acting in an official capacity on behalf of the Irish state in 2013 and
to produce a comprehensive empirical mapping of these governance entities. This
group was defined as those operating in a coercive manner at the most extreme end of
the social control spectrum and the research therefore focused on those organisations
actively prosecuting cases in the Irish courts.
A mixed method design was used to maximise both quantitative and qualitative
information. As this mapping exercise was the first of its kind, a complete collection
sample was conducted and a comprehensive questionnaire was issued to all identified
organisations. Simultaneously, the author completed a documentary analysis of relevant
reports produced by Dáil and Seanad Éireann during the first seven months of 2013.
The research succeeded in empirically mapping a total of fifty-one policing
organisations, which were active in the Irish criminal justice system. The study also
discovered a substantial increase in the proliferation of these policing agencies over the
last two decades. In addition, there appeared to be a greater preponderance to select the
prosecution option as an enforcement method, with long established organisations now
prosecuting for the first time.
The research has relevance to the Irish state, as it has for the first time documented all
prosecuting (policing) organisations operating within the Irish criminal justice system,
alongside An Garda Síochána and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The study
allows policy makers to compare and contrast organisations performing a similar
policing role with a view to maximising efficiency of resources and also to ensure that
those charged with policing Irish society do so in a fair and transparent manner.
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CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Rationale for the Research
One consequence of the post welfare state period was the transfer of traditional policing
duties from state police to various factions across society. This occurrence, labelled as
‘pluralisation’ is widely recognised in criminological literature. However, it would
appear from a review of existing literature that research in the field of plural policing
has concentrated on the transfer of policing roles to the general public and to the ever
expanding commercial sector of private security (Crawford, Lister, Blackburn, and
Burnett, 2005). Much less explored are the many state agencies that now perform a
policing role and it is this gap in the literature, which is the rationale for this study.
This gap is somewhat surprising given the ‘indispensable’ importance attributed to the
state, and the forms of public policing governed by it, by such acclaimed scholars as
Loader and Walker (2007:7). Such a study is of even greater relevance to the Irish state,
which has undergone a major expansion of state agencies since the early 1990s with
what MacCarthaigh (2010:11) described as being a ‘wave of agency establishment’.
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Research
The role of An Garda Síochána, which acts as the lead law enforcement agency within
the Irish state is complemented by an increasing number of government organisations,
which pro-actively police their own particular field of responsibility. In fact, the official
website for the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) includes a ‘Criminal Process
Chart’, with the wording ‘An Garda Síochána & Specialised Investigating Agencies
conduct independent criminal investigations’. The aim of this research was to explore
the various policing organisations in existence in 2013 in Ireland and produce a
comprehensive empirical mapping of these governance entities.
objectives, which was developed to fulfil this aim, is listed below.
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A clear set of

1. To identify the different policing organisations in Ireland.
2. To critically evaluate and explain any emerging patterns in terms of the number
of such organisations.
3. To track the policing activities of these organisations, specifically the use of
prosecutions.
4. To identify the links between the policing organisations and governance.
This research was unique in that no similar empirical mapping exercise had been
undertaken. It was very much an exploratory thesis to identity the policing entities of
the Irish state outside of An Garda Síochána.
1.3 Main Findings and Recommendations
The research identified a total of 51 Irish state agencies, authorities, boards,
commissions, government departments, institutes, offices, regulators and societies, all
of which have actually taken a prosecution case through the Irish Courts for breach of
the legislation or regulations under their care. The study also confirmed the rapid
expansion of the number of these organisations throughout the last two decades. While
it is clearly evident that a wide variety of compliance and enforcement options are
employed, there are indications that there has been a greater preponderance to select the
prosecution option as an enforcement method, with long established organisations now
prosecuting for the first time.
1.4 Outline of Chapters
Chapter two presents a review of the current literature on plural policing and includes an
examination of the visibility of Irish State policing providers. Chapter three details the
research methodology and the rationale regarding the chosen approach. The findings of
the research are outlined in chapter four while chapter five provides an in-depth analysis
and discussion of these findings, which are interpreted and considered with regard to the
current literature. Finally, chapter six outlines the conclusions and recommendations,
which emanate from the research.
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CHAPTER 2
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines and evaluates the literature on plural policing. It maps out the
development and expansion of plural policing before considering the various ways
states have adapted to a networked society. The chapter then examines the possible
future of plural policing before concluding with an exploration of the literature, which
has specifically identified the existence and roles of a variety of policing providers.
2.2 Background

2.2.1

Police, Policing and Security: Defined

An understanding of the terms police, policing and security is of paramount importance
to any study of pluralised policing. The police are one of many contributors to the
maintenance of social order, uniquely situated at the most formal end of the social
control spectrum. They represent an organised form of order maintenance (Cohen,
1995; Jones and Newburn, 1998), which involves ‘surveillance and sanctions’
(Newburn and Reiner, 2007:914). But while the term public police is understood to
mean the single entity of state police, public policing more correctly refers to all public
or state agencies that perform policing duties. Also, in the context of policing studies,
the term ‘security’ is often given a wide meaning akin to crime control (Loader and
Walker, 2007).
However, defining policing is acknowledged as being problematic (Newburn, 2008) and
associated terms are open to wide interpretation and misuse. For example, the phrases
public police and public policing are often incorrectly treated as having the same
meaning. This is clearly visible when Crawford (2006:461) graphs public “police”,
which he limits to ‘sworn officers and community support officers’, when comparing
the expanding numbers of “public policing” against the private sector. By doing so, he
incorrectly portrays police and policing as having the same meaning. The word security
is equally open to misunderstanding. The term has many different meanings and is
14

often prone to a narrow interpretation of protection from harm. The literature indicates
that this narrow meaning has been adopted on occasion, especially in direct
comparisons with the private security sector (Dupont and Wood, 2006; Johnston, 2006;
Loader and Walker, 2007). At other times, a wider definition encompassing crime
control is applied (Loader and Walker, 2007). Indeed, the term ‘security and policing’
is often used within plural policing discourse (Crawford, 2006; Ellison and O'Rawe,
2010). This phrase automatically links the two concepts but equally indicates that they
have very different meanings. However, the term ‘security governance’ is advanced to
encompass all forms of policing as suggested by Johnston and Shearing (2003).

2.2.2

Late Modern Transformations

From the earliest social contract theorists, the security of every citizen has been
intimately linked to the state with the image of Hobbes’ Leviathan representing an allpowerful state (Hobbes, 1996; Locke, 1988). The state reserved sole custody over the
use of legitimate force (Weber, 1978) and was thus perceived to have primary
responsibility for policing and citizen security. At the same time, state appointed police
were seen to monopolise policing (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) and although private
security policing existed, it was very much subordinate to the public police (Crawford,
2006) who enjoyed ‘a pivotal place’ in security matters (Loader and Sparks, 2007:79).
But this state centred policing structure changed with the arrival of the late modernity
age, which ushered in an array of transformations across all aspects of social life. In
policing terms, the bureaucratic state ‘command and control’ structure (Wood and
Shearing, 2007:8), which had existed virtually unchallenged, was now being countered
by new style networked governance that was replacing old style hierarchies (Crawford,
2006). Loader and Walker (2001) referred to this as ‘a progressive de-coupling of
police and state’.
This apparent shift towards plural policing was recognised as a central issue within
criminology and police studies throughout the world (Jones and Newburn, 2006) with
several authors raising concerns about legitimacy, accountability and fairness in this
expanding pluralised policing network (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Loader and
Walker, 2007; Reiner, 2010). The literature also predicted that increased numbers of
the population would be subjected to police type scrutiny (Shearing and Stenning 1983;
15

Wakefield, 2003; Zedner, 2004) with Zedner (2004) also forewarning of potential
injustices caused by strikingly divergent policies of the different prosecution agencies.
The warning issued by Johnston (2001) that diverse policing, if left unchecked may
create a fragmented, ineffective, unjust and overly invasive system of policing is
particularly stark. Criminologists recognised that some empirical mapping had taken
place but advocated a need for increased empirical data (Loader and Walker, 2007),
which was described as being ‘rather thin’ (Dupont and Wood, 2006:241).

2.2.3

From Police To Policing

In this new pluralised environment, the police retained primary responsibility for
deploying legitimate force but were now seen as just one of many security providers.
As Newburn (2008) correctly observed, policing and the police were no longer
synonymous. This broader concept of policing, which included an assembly of formal
social controls (Jones and Newburn, 1998) was aptly entitled ‘security governance’ by
Shearing and Stenning (1981). Individual policing entities (or nodes) then co-existed
within this pluralised security quilt (Ericson, 1994) in what Newburn (2008) referred to
as a proliferation of policing beyond the police. Alongside state police, policing roles
were now being discharged by a plethora of providers from the wider public sector, the
commercial sector, voluntary groups and even the civilian population (Newburn, 2007).
In a reference to Stan Cohen’s (1985) fishing metaphor, Shearing (2001) declared, ‘The
net will be widened and thinned, but those fishing will not be exclusively state
officials’. Crawford and Lister (2004) and Johnston (2003) referred to an extended
policing family while Jones and Newburn (2006:4) called this new environment ‘a
policing patchwork’. The public police were no longer the sole policing agent but
instead a new multilateral security network had arisen (Bayley and Shearing, 2001).
The literature identifies the extent of the change but while Bayley and Shearing
announced a monumental end to the public monopoly of policing claiming that ‘one
system of policing ended and another took its place’ (1996), many others have
convincingly countered this claim by showing that crime control has never been
exclusive to the state (Crawford, 2008; Garland, 1996; Jones and Newburn, 2006;
Newburn, 2001; Reiner, 2010; Zedner, 2004).

Indeed, Zedner (2006) opined that

pluralisation was nothing new, but simply a reversion back to eighteenth century
policing; Braithwaite’s (2000) ‘night watchman state’, when crime control was very
16

much the business of non-state entities. Despite these differing opinions and also the
fact that the police still dominate our understanding of policing (Reiner, 2010), it would
appear that there is widespread agreement that there now exists a diverse multiplicity of
policing providers.
2.3 The Expansion of Plural Policing

2.3.1

Reasons for Expansion

A number of explanations have been proffered as to why policing has pluralised.
Crawford (2006) for example, has argued that the scope of the public police has been
constrained by limited finances and others now provide these policing services.
However, Jones and Newburn (2006) demonstrate that both police numbers and budgets
have actually increased and they have claimed it is more accurate to talk about a
demand-gap where the demands on public police increased more rapidly then the
growth in police resources. Another theory is that society has now concluded that the
police and the wider criminal justice system have a limited capacity and that the police
are simply ‘spread too thinly’ to cope with the levels of crime (Reiner, 2010:23).
The changing nature of policing public and private spaces is also credited with the
expansion of policing beyond state police.

Shearing and Stenning (1981) have

contended that the growth in ‘mass private property’ such as shopping centres has
created the greater demand for private security while Newburn (2007) claims that
increased policing numbers is partly due to a formalisation of informal security
governance positions such as bus conductors.
The work of Mulcahy (2012) is particularly instructive when examining this question
from a purely Irish perspective. Mulcahy (2012) mapped out the governance of crime
and security and illustrated the lack of demand for plural policing in Ireland. He
suggested that the Gardaí were deemed by the Irish public to be able to cope with
existing crime levels, at least until the 1960s/1970s when increased crime statistics
coupled with the arrival of heroin prompted a concerned general public as well as a
sudden political interest in criminal justice matters.
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2.3.2

Consequences of Plural Policing

The literature indicates that the state itself has been weakened by the expansion of other
policing providers. The effect of globalising and localising forces (Newburn, 2007),
privatisation and regulatory expansion (Braithwaite, 2000) were deemed to have caused
a hollowing out of the state (Rhodes, 1994). In contrast, several authors have applauded
the increase in regulation claiming the state is actually strengthened, not weakened, by
regulatory governance (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Rose and Miller, 1992; Shearing
and Berg, 2006; Zedner, 2004).

The claim is that this rule-at-a-distance concept

strengthens the state by extending state influence and governance (Rose and Miller,
1992). The state also benefits from the formation of alliances across various networks
(Young, 2007). In a similar context, it could be argued that global securitisation and the
emergence of supranational institutions such as the European Police Office (Europol),
which are seen to enhance policing capacity across Europe (Loader, 2002) either
diminishes the role of the state as a sole policing provider or alternatively, actually
increases the state’s power by uniting with its European partners.
Another quite different consequence of pluralisation is a ‘blurring of the distinction’
(Zedner, 2004:3) between the state and civil society, and between public and private
policing. There is now a greater overlap in techniques and roles such as patrolling,
investigation and the application of sanctions according to Morgan and Newburn
(1997), Newburn (2008) and Shearing (2001).
2.4 The Multiplicity of State Models
It is widely accepted that states have relinquished some control over policing and that
there has been a general shift from direct control to increased governance. However,
states appear to have adapted to pluralism in different ways, the work of Crawford
(2006) and McLaughlin (2007) is particularly insightful. Firstly, in some cases states
have held on to their function as sole policing provider and in an act of ‘flexing their
muscles’ (Bauman, 1999:50), they have increased public police powers and punitive
laws in what Garland (2001) referred to as an act of denial. In other cases the state has
withdrawn completely and simply allowed market forces to apply (Hayek, 1988). In
addition, two other prominent models have evolved, both of which promote a network
approach to policing. These are (a) nodal governance, where various public and private
18

entities (or nodes) work together in equal partnership within networks and (b) anchored
pluralism, where pluralism and networking thrive but where the state retains overall
importance and effectively acts as the lead node. Empirical research has identified that
all of these models co-exist to form ‘a complex mosaic’ (Crawford et al., 2005:90). The
next section of this chapter provides a detailed consideration of these models.

2.4.1

State withdrawal from Front-line Policing

As outlined, one adaptation by the state was to accept that it was no longer the sole
provider of security. It then proceeded to assign responsibility for crime control to the
private sector and the general public. The concept of ‘responsibilisation’, which began
its criminological origins with Michel Foucault (1977) and Stan Cohen (1985), allowed
states to distribute ownership of crime control across many factions of society. As
crime became seen as inevitable (Garland, 2001), state strategy shifted to surveillance
and crime prevention. States actively encouraged others to participate in crime control
and this effectively widened the security governance net. Crawford (2008) referred to
this as an explosion in crime initiatives focused upon prevention rather than cure.

Another development in late modernity was the adoption of an American concept
(Eisner, 2000) whereby states, in part as a result of new European Union legislation,
shifted from direct rule to indirect rule by appointing independent regulatory agencies.
The expansion of regulatory agencies, which maximise compliance-based law
enforcement, is seen as an example of the risk society promoted by Ericson and
Haggerty (1997). Manning (2006:114) categorised the models of regulation as being:
the criminal coercive model, the compliance-negotiation model and the co-operative
model. Braithwaite (2000), Crawford (2008) and Hardiman (2012) have all highlighted
this expansion as being a very significant event, even prompting Braithwaite (2000) to
declare that the ‘Keynesian State’ had now been replaced by the ‘New Regulatory
State’. In Irish terms, Westrup (2012) declared the increase in regulatory agencies to be
perhaps the most significant change to Irish governance.

However, in addition to state withdrawal, two dominant theoretical frameworks offer an
alternative course of action. These are described in the next section.
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2.4.2

Nodal Governance

Johnston, Shearing and Wood have written quite extensively in favour of the model of
nodal governance, while Dupont, Burris and Berg are also proponents of this form of
governance. It is posited that while each individual constituent (or node) can operate in
isolation it is only when they harness their knowledge and capacity and communicate
across networks that they reach their true potential (Burris, 2004). Under the nodal
governance model, each node has equal standing and is part of a horizontal alliance
joining forces in the spirit of cooperation (Johnston and Shearing, 2003). The sovereign
state is but one node within this ‘network of power’ (Shearing and Berg, 2006:194) and
it holds no priority over others (Johnston and Shearing, 2003). Indeed Shearing and
Wood (2003) re-introduced the term ‘denizen’ to denote a person within a specific node
rather than use the term ‘citizen’ with its obvious state related connotations. Similarly
Morgan and Newburn (1997:73) while recognising that the public police have an
essential role in policing networks, question whether they should take ‘the lead part’.
Shearing and Wood (2003:217) go further by seeking to establish nodal governance
firmly within the community, maximising local knowledge and ability and thus creating
what they call ‘community governance’.
However, Thompson (2003) has warned of the demise of networks due to a retraction of
policy making into hierarchies and also due to the expansion of privatisation and private
sector techniques into public sector business. Equally, these networks can be complex
with the literature reporting a lack of co-ordination and effectiveness (Crawford, 2005;
Verhage, Terpstra, Deelman, Muylaert and Van Parys, 2010; Zedner, 2004).

The

solution to this may be to create co-ordinating structures such as super-structural nodes,
which can act as command centres of networked governance (Drahos, 2004) or
alternatively overarching policing commissions (Loader, 2000; Shearing, 2001).
In practical terms the proponents of nodal governance often cite the two examples of the
Zwelethemba Peace Committees in South Africa and the police boards established
under the Patten Commission in Northern Ireland as actual examples of nodalisation at
work. However, Braithwaite (2000), Ellison and O’Rawe (2010), and Reiner (2010)
have all claimed there are flaws within these examples. Quoted Irish examples, include
the Criminal Assets Bureau and local authority enforcement (Mulcahy, 2012) and the
recently formed Joint Policing Committees (Harrington 2011).
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2.4.3

State Anchored Pluralism

In contrast, promoting an alternative to the nodalisation theoretical framework, Loader
and Walker (2007:7) believe the state and public police are ‘indispensable’ and ‘pivotal’
to security governance and that the state could never be merely one of many equal
nodes. They cite expanding state powers as evidence that the state is very much centre
stage in security governance matters. They accept the concept of networks and declare
there should be ‘as much pluralism as possible’ (Loader and Walker, 2007:193).
However their version is what is termed ‘an anchored’ pluralist model where the state is
the lead partner effectively retaining control over policing matters (Loader and Walker,
2006:8). Braithwaite (2000), Crawford (2006), Marks and Goldsmith (2006), White
(2011) and Zedner (2004) all support this concept.
To support the idea that the state is an essential leading component of any network,
Loader and Walker (2007:170) proffer the idea that security is a ‘thick public good’,
which needs protection. They advocate that security should not be a private commodity
or ‘club good’, to be bought and sold and only available to those who can afford it
(Loader and Walker, 2007:170). In simple terms, they strongly believe that commercial
interests conflict with public good interests. In support of this argument Crawford
(2006) graphically illustrated the difficulties experienced by London businesses in
obtaining insurance following an IRA bombing in London in 1992. In this case, the
British government took action and acted as ‘an insurer of last resort’ demonstrating the
need for the state (Crawford, 2006:459).
2.5 The Future of Plural Policing
The empirical evidence gathered by Jones and Newburn (2006) reveals that plural
policing is developing across a number of jurisdictions and indeed continents. With the
exception of Greece, there has been a dramatic growth in the private security sector and
a diversification of policing across ‘a complex patchwork of agencies’ (Jones and
Newburn, 2006:34). The literature indicates that this pluralised world of policing and
security is set to continue as a general trend (Dupont and Wood, 2006), despite Yar’s
(2011) warning that network governance, like its predecessors, could well be replaced
by another mode of social co-ordination in due course. However if plural policing is the
future, the question is which model of security governance will flourish? The answer to
21

this is debated in Wood and Dupont’s (2006) compilation ‘Democracy, Society and the
Governance of Security’, which is an excellent compendium of the various academic
opinions in this field of study. While at first glance it appears the literature is simply
divided between the two dominant theories of nodal governance and anchored
pluralism, with the key difference between the two being the role of the state (White,
2011), further investigation reveals that it is not a simple case of two factions opposed
as pro and anti-state mentalities but rather the differences are much more subtle and can
be quite nuanced.
For example, the research literature clearly shows that both theories recognise the
importance of the state. Nodal governance proponents agree with Loader and Walker
(2001), and acknowledge that the state should not be forgotten (Shearing and Berg,
2006) and that it is a crucial player within governance (Johnston, 2006). Equally,
everyone appears to agree that there is a need to look beyond the state. For example
Shearing and Berg (2006) suggest that other non-state local entities should take
responsibility for policing and security.

In contrast, for supporters of anchored

pluralism, ‘beyond the state’ simply means bringing in more policing partners to work
with the state in a pluralised world (Crawford, 2006).
There appears to be some agreement on a number of other issues such as the importance
of democracy. However, both sides claim it is their particular model that best promotes
democracy (Loader and Walker, 2001 and 2007; Wood and Shearing, 2007). Equally,
while Shearing (2006) agrees with the concept of anchored pluralism, he argues that
pluralism has multiple state, supra state and non-state anchors and agrees to an anchor
but just not a state anchor.
2.6 Visibility of State Policing Providers
While the transfer of traditional police functions to the private sector and to the general
public dominates plural policing discourse, there is little discussion regarding the role of
state bodies that actively perform policing functions. The research literature reveals that
there is a significant absence of any reference to these state entities, when estimating the
size of public policing; with Zedner (2006) being one of the very few exceptions.
However, there is now a growing awareness of these organisations and their importance
is clearly recognised by Jones and Newburn (2006:4) who referred to them as being ‘a
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significant element’ within the broader notion of plural policing. Newburn and Reiner
(2007) also declared that the increased attention paid to the activities of a range of
governmental regulatory and investigatory agencies was one of the three key
developments within pluralisation.
Early recognition came when Newburn (2001) identified a variety of specialised
policing providers.

He categorised environmental health officers, benefit fraud

investigators and others under the title ‘Other public policing bodies’. Later Jones and
Newburn (2006) declared that local authorities actually performed a range of policing
functions, and Gibson and Cavadino (2008:11) subsequently identified a number of
‘investigators from other authorities’. However, it was Crawford (2008) who produced
the most comprehensive list of organisations involved in plural policing. As part of
this, his description of the reporting structures illustrated a complex government web of
policing providers (Crawford, 2008).
In an Irish context, Kilcommins, O’Donnell, O’Sullivan and Vaughan (2004), when
reviewing the development of the criminal justice policy and practice in Ireland,
documented some examples of prosecutions, seizures, warning letters and case details
of offences ‘processed by other agencies’. They mention the Revenue Commissioners,
Health and Safety Authority (HSA), Office of Director of Corporate Enforcement
(ODCE), Department of Social and Family Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Central and Regional Fisheries Board, Dublin Bus, local authorities, the Health
Board and An Post as some examples of these organisations. They observed that,
society tends to be more concerned about the potential harms caused by drug
addicts wielding knives or syringes than by businessmen signing dodgy deals
(2004:102)
Most recently, Westrup (2012) identified ten new Irish regulatory agencies, set up
between 1991 and 2004, a number of which have a policing function. However, this is
only part of the picture as during the budget speech of 2009, the government announced
the merger of a number of state agencies with a general plan to reduce the number of
state bodies and agencies by forty-one (O'Toole and Dooney, 2009). This reduction
should be considered in conjunction with the examination of public sector trends by
Boyle (2012) which highlighted that the largest decrease in staff numbers between 2008
and 2012 was suffered by the non-commercial state agencies (19 per cent), local
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authorities (14 per cent) and the justice sector (13 per cent). In addition, MacCarthaigh
reported that between April 2007 and April 2010, eight new state agencies were created
while eighteen ceased to exist (2010).
However, the reality is that the visibility of Irish policing providers is further obscured
by the lack of meaningful crime data.

Irish literature consistently stresses the

limitations of official crime figures (Kilcommins et al., 2004; Walsh and Mulqueen,
2009) and calls for improvements in data collection and publication (Rogan, 2012).
However the imminent introduction of a whole of government performance
measurement portal, ‘Ireland Stat’, as described by Downes, Kennedy and Nic Gearailt
(2013), which will allow the comparison of programme and policy outcomes across
government bodies, has the potential to be a significant milestone in the visibility and
transparency of state policing providers.
2.7 Summary
The research literature has highlighted that police and policing has gone through a
transformation and that there is clear evidence of an expansion and diversity of those
involved in policing. In particular, the literature indicates that while the criminological
discourse on state policing organisations is underdeveloped, there appears to be a
growing awareness and appreciation of such state entities. The multiplicity of state
models suggest that there has been a general shift from direct control to increased
governance but while there is general agreement that networked or nodal governance is
the future of policing, there is disagreement regarding the actual role the state should
play in such networks. Irish literature has particularly highlighted a constant change in
those involved in plural policing together with a lack of meaningful crime data for the
work of these organisations.
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CHAPTER 3
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the research methodology used to evaluate the
overall aim of the study, which was to explore and produce a comprehensive empirical
mapping of the policing organisations in existence in 2013 in Ireland. The first section
of this chapter outlines the philosophical element of the research and explains the
rationale for the selected research design. The research methods, data collection and
sampling are then discussed. The limitations and ethical issues to the research are
highlighted in the final section.
3.2 Research Design
Research design and methods are based on different perceptions of reality (Fielding and
Schreier, 2001), specifically, what is reality (ontology) and how is knowledge of this
reality developed (epistemology). The primary research crosses into both objective and
subjective realms of ontology and the actual collection of data is based on a postpositivism epistemology encompassing a numeric observation of the social world.
The specific design selected for the research, which was influenced by the objective of
the study did not fit neatly into any one paradigm. The design could be best described
as referencing the theory to the empirical data in an effort to establish if the theory was
applicable to Ireland. To achieve this, an amalgam of quantitative and qualitative
methods was applied and as such the design falls into the wide net of a mixed methods
design. This approach is described as one where the researcher ‘draws inferences using
both qualitative and quantitative approaches…in a single study’ (Tashakkori and
Creswell, 2007:4).
This research collected and analysed quantitative data to identify state organisations,
acting in a policing capacity, and then subjected these results to a qualitative analysis.
This approach concurs with Creswell and Clark who recognised the practicality of being
‘free to use all methods possible to address a research problem’ (Creswell and Clark,
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2011:13).

Although there are many good reasons for choosing a mixed method

approach as illustrated by Creswell and Clark, (2011), the author’s specific reasons were
to corroborate the results and to underpin the findings. Quantitative research was
necessary to identify the target group and evaluate any increase in the numbers. The
qualitative research methodology was used to analyse documentary data of the
Oireachtas, organisational annual reports and prosecution policy material in order to
enhance the understanding of these policing organisations.
3.3 Research Methods, Data Collection and Sampling
For the purpose of the research, the author confined the definition of state organisations
involved in policing activities to include only organisations that prosecuted offenders
for breach of Irish legislation. With the ability to enforce such coercive powers these
organisations are very much at the most formal end of the social control spectrum and
were deemed to perform a policing function. Zedner (2004), in referring to similar
agents observed ‘as prosecuting bodies they fulfil a core criminal justice function’,
while Newburn and Reiner (2007) emphasised the ability to impose sanctions as a
defining element of the police. Manning (2006:114) also categorised one of the models
of regulation as being, a ‘criminal coercive model’.

3.3.1

Phase 1: The Research Questionnaire

The research method was strongly influenced by the difficulty in identifying the
relevant policing organisations.

The author first examined the possibility of

documenting the policing activities of these agencies by means of a documentary
analysis of published annual and other official reports. However, it was decided to
issue a questionnaire to an identified target grouping to maximise the accuracy of the
data. This purposive sampling technique described as selecting cases ‘based on a
specific purpose rather than randomly’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003:713), contributed
to the accuracy of the research, however it did have a negative impact regarding
efficiency due to the time involved when communicating in person. The research
included one hundred percent of the relevant organisations in the target sample. Teddlie
and Yu (2007:204) noted that this ‘complete collection’ or ‘criterion sampling’ while
normally used in qualitative studies could also be used to generate numeric data.

26

In order to identify the potential organisations that might use coercive powers such as
prosecution as part of their compliance activities, the author contacted a number of key
offices within the Irish criminal justice system: the Chief State Solicitor’s Office
(CSSO), DPP and the Courts Service of Ireland.

While the CSSO and the DPP

confirmed that they did not maintain a list of prosecuting authorities, the Courts
Information Office was able to identify all organisations that had previously taken a
prosecution in the District Court.

While this historic list naturally included

organisations that had ceased to exist, this method identified more than 40 potential
prosecutors and acted as a solid foundation in identifying the target group.
The researcher examined all government department websites and scrutinised two
selected documents from MacCarthaigh (2009 and 2010), which identified commercial
and non-commercial national level agencies. The official websites of approximately
100 organisations were then scanned for references to prosecutions.

Some

organisations clearly stated that they did not prosecute but passed on investigations to
An Garda Síochána. Following this screening exercise a list containing 69 potential
organisations was established.
A pilot questionnaire was issued to four managers within the Revenue Commissioners
(the author’s organisation) to test the instrument. Valuable feedback was provided and
the questionnaire was amended.

The questionnaire was drafted with closed-ended

questions with predetermined response scales and restricted categories containing both
binary and nominal variables. A copy of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.
The questionnaire was divided into three components. The first component related to
the structure, staffing levels and year of establishment.

The second component

requested general information on prosecutions, legal advice, delegated authority,
prosecution staff, powers and actual use of prosecutions.

The third component

requested specific information on prosecutions including prosecution numbers,
publication policy and type of offences prosecuted. As a preview of official publications
indicated that prosecutions were recorded very differently across a number of
organisations, the questionnaire sought to ensure a level of consistently by explicitly
requesting details of cases actually prosecuted and finalised in a specific year.
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The author initiated communications by telephoning the relevant information office or
press officer. This allowed for an explanation of the purpose of the research and
succeeded in directing the questionnaire to the appropriate unit in most cases. In
another 12 cases the author issued e-mails to a generic information box. A total of 69
questionnaires were issued to all organisations in July and August 2013. Reminder emails were issued in 36 cases and follow up clarification telephone calls were made in
nine cases.

A total of 62 (90%) organisations responded.

Of those returned, 15

confirmed they did not prosecute while another five organisations, although
prosecutors, chose not to complete the questionnaire. Forty-two organisations in total
completed the questionnaire.
The researcher set the inclusion criteria for policing to be those organisations actually
using the coercive powers at the most formal end of the social control spectrum. Only
organisations that had actually prosecuted offenders for breach of the legislation were
deemed to be active in plural policing. Three of those who completed a questionnaire
stated they had not actually prosecuted even though they had the powers to do so.
These questionnaires, which were received from the Central Bank, Property Services
Regulatory Authority (PSRA) and the Railway Safety Commission (RSC), were
subsequently withdrawn from the findings and analysis.

The 39 valid returned

questionnaires represented 76% of the final identified target group.

3.3.2

Phase II: Oireachtas

The second phase of the research involved a documentary analysis of selected material
generated by both houses of the Irish parliament between January and July 2013. The
purpose of this research phase was to assist in the identification of organisations and act
as a further source of data in addition to the questionnaires. Documentary analysis is a
systematic procedure for evaluating documents, ‘in order to elicit meaning, gain
understanding, and develop empirical knowledge’ (Bowen, 2009:27). The reports from
Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann included both written and oral Parliamentary
Questions (PQ) and general debates. This research method was selected because the
national parliament (the Oireachtas) debates and passes all laws (O'Toole and Dooney,
2009) and represents ‘the main authorizers of public security’ (Dupont, 2006:91).
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The author utilised two web sites, to identify the number of times the term prosecution
was used in conjunction with a named prosecuting organisation. The initial search
criteria were ‘prosecution’ and variations of the word. The search engines returned 444
cases from www.KildareStreet.com and 455 cases from www.oireachtas.ie.

The

difference of 2% was considered acceptable and this acted as a validation check for the
search results. The author used the cases returned by www.KildareStreet.com as this
site allowed a direct link to individual cases unlike the Oireachtas website which links
back to a full day’s business.

3.3.3

Phase III: Courts Service

This phase of the research was used to explore the level of policing activity, in terms of
prosecutions, accredited to all policing providers.

The researcher scrutinised the

statistics and annual reports (2011 and 2012) of the Courts Service of Ireland. The
examination focussed on the District court, as this court processed 95% of all criminal
matters in 2012 including the vast majority of cases relevant to this study (Courts
Service, Annual Report 2012).

3.3.4

Local Authorities

Local authorities were considered as part of the primary research as they were known to
command a significant policing brief. Under the Local Government Act 2001 the state
is divided into 114 local authorities: twenty-nine county, five city and eighty town
councils. Each council is technically independent but forms part of the wider local
government system. The author therefore decided to treat this group as one single
entity, similar to Garda Divisions all reporting into one organisation. Indeed, O'Toole
and Dooney (2009:240) have opined ‘in many ways the local authority service is a
single service’. The issue of a questionnaire to this group was deemed impractical but
in an attempt to quantify the level of prosecution work undertaken by local authorities,
the author contacted the Department of Environment, Community and Local
Government (DECLG) and also the Local Government Management Agency (LGMA).
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3.4 Data Preparation and Analysis

3.3.3

Questionnaire

The data was carefully collated and analysed to ensure the quality of both ‘the scores’
and ‘the conclusions’ (Creswell and Clark, 2011:210). While, the data was pre-coded,
there was an element of post-data collection coding. The data was analysed using Excel
and missing values and contradictory entries were minimised by telephoning the named
contact person returned on the questionnaire.

This occurred in nine of the 42

questionnaires returned and thus maximised the quality and accuracy of the data in the
research. However, it was necessary to omit certain organisations from the analysis of
specific questions where a missing or invalid entry remained, for example, the number
of prosecutions returned by the Loughs Agency included prosecutions in both Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
While 12 potential prosecuting authorities did not complete the questionnaire it was
possible, via the Courts Service, organisational websites and annual reports, to confirm
that 11 of them performed a prosecutorial role. These additional named organisations
were included on the list of prosecutors and two of them, the Companies Registration
Office (CRO) and the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (PSI)) were included in the
prosecution statistics as such details were very obvious in their respective annual
reports. Any information sourced in this way is clearly identified in the relevant tables.
This resulted in the identification of 50 organisations and a final total of 51
organisations with the inclusion of local authorities, which were counted as a single
entity. The high number of policing organisations in the sample (76%) authenticates the
validity and reliability of the research.

3.3.4

Oireachtas

The 444 cases, which were identified using www.KildareStreet.com, were screened to
isolate only those cases that specifically made a reference to an identified organisation
other than An Garda Síochána and only then where the organisation was mentioned in
enforcement, coercive or regulatory roles, that is, their policing role. A casual mention
of an individual organisation was excluded. This generated 159 reference reports,
which were then subjected to an in-depth evaluation noting key issues and patterns.
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These key issues were then clustered or coded (Bell, 2005) and conclusions and theories
were extracted.
The documentary analysis revealed prosecution statistics for An Post, the EPA and the
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (GSOC), all of which agreed very closely
with the prosecution figures returned on the questionnaire and thus acted as another
validation check (PQ 1808/13; PQ 3705/13; Dáil debates, 2 May 2013).
3.4 Data Limitations:
The main limitation of the research is that it is not possible to confirm if every
individual policing (prosecuting) authority has been captured within the study. Equally
not all those identified as target respondents completed the questionnaire, with a small
number being reluctant or unable to do so. Equally a small number of questionnaires
were returned with some uncompleted questions. Another limitation is the meaning of
the term ‘prosecuted’ and the different counting rules used by organisations when
reporting prosecution statistics.
3.5 Ethical Issues
The ethical codes of both Dublin Institute of Technology and the Sociological
Association of Ireland were used as a guiding framework of principles throughout the
research. The researcher was particularly cognisant of the importance of informed
consent and the need not to cause harm to any participants (O’Leary, 2004). To ensure
informed consent, the researcher issued a detailed introductory letter (Appendix A) with
each questionnaire (Appendix B) clearly outlining the nature of the study. There was a
strong emphasise on only gathering information that was already in the public domain.
The questionnaire also included ‘opt-out’ choices to safeguard the operational interests
of the respondents if required. It is significant that ten different agencies availed of this
option. As such, the questionnaire was designed to elicit maximum information but also
to safeguard the interests of those replying. While details of Oireachtas business are a
matter of public record and the ethical concerns are, therefore, considerably lessened,
the author has nevertheless ensured the accuracy of the information reproduced.
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3.7 Summary
This chapter has justified the approach to the research. It has outlined the rationale for a
mixed method design and has presented the argument for selecting a questionnaire as
the primary method of data collection. The chapter also explained the rationale for the
documentary analysis of Oireachtas reports and how the information was gathered and
analysed. It provided a comprehensive description as to how the target group was
identified and contacted, and clearly outlined the rationale for the inclusion or deliberate
omission of certain information. Finally, the author has outlined the data limitations
and the relevant ethical issues.
The next chapter presents the findings, which resulted from the questionnaire and the
documentary analysis of Oireachtas reports, Courts Service and official publications.
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CHAPTER 4
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the information elicited from the questionnaires, the documentary
analysis of the Oireachtas reports, the Courts Service and official publications. The
chapter examines the relevant District court statistics and provides an insight into the
level of prosecutions undertaken nationally by all policing organisations. Key trends
are highlighted and charted throughout the chapter.
4.2 Ireland’s Policing Authorities

4.2.1

Identification

The questionnaire asked respondents to confirm if they had the authority to prosecute in
their own name (Q.10) and also to confirm the year of the first prosecution (Q.11).
Thirty-seven of the 39 respondents to the questionnaire confirmed they had delegated
authority and could initiate prosecutions in their own name or the name of the minister.
The other two organisations, GSOC and the Sea Fisheries Protection Authority (SFPA),
confirmed they investigated cases and forwarded them directly to the DPP for
consideration of prosecution (without an intervention from An Garda Síochána). As a
matter of standing practice, cases from the Revenue Commissioners are also taken in the
name of the DPP.

The primary research also identified another 12 prosecuting

organisations via data analysis of official publications and from the Courts Service
(these cases are marked as * on Table 1).

A total of 51 individual prosecuting

authorities (Table 1) were therefore identified. By definition these 51 organisations
perform a coercive policing role within the Irish state, alongside An Garda Síochána and
can therefore be categorised as Ireland’s other policing providers.
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Table 1 - Irish State Policing (Prosecuting) Authorities
Organisation
An Post
Bus Éireann*
Central Statistics Office
Commission for Aviation Regulation
Commission for Communications Regulation*
Commission for Energy Regulation
Companies Registration Office*
Competition Authority
Data Protection Commissioner
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine
Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht (NPWS)
Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources*
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government*
Department of Health*
Department of Social Protection
Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport
Drogheda Port Company*
Dublin Bus
Electricity Supply Board
Environmental Protection Agency
Fáilte Ireland*
Food Safety Authority of Ireland
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission
Health and Safety Authority
Health Service Executive*
Iarnród Éireann
Inland Fisheries Ireland
Irish Aviation Authority
Irish Medicines Board
Local Authorities*
Loughs Agency
Luas
National Consumer Agency
National Education Welfare Board
National Employment Rights Authority
National Milk Agency
National Tobacco Control Office (HSE)
National Transport Authority
NSAI Legal Metrology Service
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement
Office of the Revenue Commissioners
Pensions Board
Pensions Ombudsman
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland*
Plant Variety Development Office*
Private Residential Tenancies Board
Private Security Authority
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland
Road Safety Authority
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority
Veterinary Council of Ireland
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Year Est.
1984
1987
1949
2001
2002
1999
1922
1991
1989
1897
2009
2007
1919
1947
1947
1959
1997
1952
1927
1993
2003
1999
2007
1989
2005
1946
1852
1993
1996
1898
1952
2004
2007
2002
2007
1994
2010
2003
1996
2001
1923
1990
2003
2007
1977
2004
2004
1992
2006
2007
1931

While not covered by the questionnaire, local authorities merit a specific mention, due
to the high number of councils that are active in the field of prosecutions. The DECLG
clarified that the 114 local authorities reported into various departments, including
DECLG, Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport (DTTaS) and Department of
Jobs, Enterprise & Innovation (DJEI), and that no all-inclusive statistics were
maintained by their department. However, the LGMA explained that in reality only 88
of the 114 local authorities (the rating authorities) actively enforce and prosecute
offences.
Figure 1 – Structure of Policing Authorities

Structure of Policing Authorities
15%
3%
47%

10%

10%
15%
Regulatory Bodies

State sponsored bodies: Non-Commercial

State sponsored bodies: Commercial

Government Departments

Health Authority

Other

The questionnaire asked respondents to confirm the structure of the organisation (Q.4),
the results of which are presented in Figure 1. The organisations include a mixture of
government departments, state sponsored commercial and non-commercial bodies,
health authorities and regulatory bodies. However, the research established that the
majority of these organisations (47%) are dedicated regulatory bodies. The ‘other’
category includes a combination of stand-alone offices (Central Statistics Office and the
Revenue Commissioners), recognised agencies working within a government
department (NERA and the National Parks & Wildlife Service (NPWS), a cross-border
agency (Loughs agency), a private company (Transdev Ireland - the Luas operator) and
finally the National Milk Agency.
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4.2.2

Characteristics

The questionnaire asked respondents to confirm the size of the organisation (Q.6).
Almost half of the organisations reported a staffing level of more than 250
personnel while seven reported a staffing level in excess of 2,500 (Figure 2).
However, enforcement is only one activity of these organisations evidenced by the
fact that only five organisations reported that ten or more staff were dedicated to
prosecution work alone (Q.7) with almost 50% having no full-time staff assigned to
such a function.
Figure 2 – Size of Policing Organisation (Staff Numbers)
Size of Organisation (Staff Numbers)
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The questionnaire (Q.5) confirmed that the majority of prosecuting organisations report
into a government department (Figure 3). The three organisations, which do not report
into a government department, are the Commission for Energy Regulation, GSOC and
the National Tobacco Control Office of the Health Service Executive (NTCO-HSE).
The 51 prosecuting entities include a total of seven government departments (four
confirmed by questionnaire plus three confirmed by official publications).
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Figure 3 – Reporting Structures - Overview
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The study shows that of the 32 policing organisations reporting into a government
department, the majority report into DTTaS (seven organisations, all specifically
transport related) and into DJEI (6 organisations) as presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4 – Reporting Structures – Departmental level
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The questionnaire also included a number of requests for information on prosecution
related issues and the results of these are presented below. When asked to quantify the
number of staff who are dedicated solely to criminal prosecution work, ten of the 39
respondents (24%) chose not to publicise exact numbers. Also when asked if their
organisation had a dedicated centrally located Criminal Prosecution Unit, three
respondents also chose not to comment.

In a similar context, 20 organisations

confirmed that they do not publish prosecution statistics on their website.
Figure 5 – The Publication of Prosecution Case Details
The Publication of Prosecution Cases
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As a broad indicator as to how central a Figure 6 – Access to Legal Advice
prosecution or policing role is to these
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organisations the research established that of
the 39 respondents, 14 (37%) organisations
had a dedicated centrally located criminal
prosecution unit; 22 (56%) had access to an
internal legal team (Figure 6) and 30 (77%)
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4.2.3

Visibility

The documentary analysis of the Oireachtas reports and Courts Service annual reports
demonstrated the level of visibility of these organisations within the criminal justice
system. Firstly, the documentary analysis of the Oireachtas reports revealed that Irish
politicians used the phrase prosecution during 444 items of business between January
and July 2013 while sitting in Dáil or Seanad Éireann. More than one third of these
parliamentary questions and debates discussed or made reference to one or more nonGarda organisations performing a policing type function within the state as defined by
the use of prosecution (Table 2).
Table 2 - References to non-Garda Policing Organisations in the Oireachtas
Month
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
June
July

Total number of
References to nonreferences to prosecutions Garda agencies
43
22
66
21
49
15
34
15
71
28
91
23
90
35
444
159

%
51%
32%
31%
44%
39%
25%
39%
36%

The research verified the most topical non-Garda policing items discussed in the
Oireachtas during 2013. The most frequently mentioned topics are presented in
Table 3 below.
Table 3 - Topics mentioned in the Oireachtas
(Jan - Jul 2013)
Organisation
HSE
Revenue
DAFM
ODCE
Revenue
Central Bank
DAFM
Revenue
NTA
Local Authorities
DAHG

Topic
Child Care
Tobacco Fraud
Horse Related Issues
Banking Crisis / Investigations
Fuel Fraud
Banking Crisis / Investigations
Animal Welfare/Disease Issues
Tax Avoidance / Compliance
Taxi Regulation Bill 2012
Illegal Dumping
Wildlife Protection

39

Total
16
15
14
12
9
7
6
6
6
5
5

The overall finding was that from the period January to July 2013 a total of 25
individual organisations were mentioned 209 times within 159 questions and debates.

Table 4 - Prosecuting Organisations mentioned in the Oireachtas
(Jan - Jul 2013)
Organisation
Total
Revenue Commissioners
52
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine
25
Health Service Executive
21
Local Authorities
17
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement
14
Department of Social Protection
13
Central Bank of Ireland
11
Environmental Protection Agency
9
National Transport Authority
8
Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht
7
National Employment Rights Authority
6
Food Safety Authority of Ireland
4
Private Residential Tenancies Board
4
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority
3
Companies Registration Office
2
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission
2
Irish Medicines Board
2
National Tobacco Control Office
2
An Post
1
Dept. of Comms, Energy and Natural Resources
1
Department of Health
1
Inland Fisheries Ireland
1
NSAI Legal Metrology Service
1
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland
1
Private Security Authority
1
Total

209
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An examination of the annual reports and statistics produced by the Courts Service
illustrated that a total of 400,911 orders (various sanctions) were made in respect of
372,706 offences before the District Criminal Court in 2012 (Courts Service, 2012).
These statistics indicate the prosecution work undertaken by all policing bodies. While
An Garda Síochána is naturally responsible for the majority of prosecutions, the
category with the second highest number of orders (68,768) is described as ‘offences
such as breach of bail, litter offences, street trading and offences prosecuted by
government departments and other State agencies such as the Health and Safety
Authority’ (Table 5).
Table 5 - District Court Orders 2008 to 2012
District Court Orders 2008 to 2012
Year

Total Orders

‘Other’ Category

2008

550,694

74,579

2009

521,058

72,466

2010

498,672

70,528

2011

468,525

73,773

2012

400,911

68,768

If the total number of road traffic offences (RTOs) are excluded the significance of the
other category becomes even greater (Table 6). The reasoning for excluding the road
traffic offences is because this single category of offences at 59% of all orders
overshadows all other court business. It is also notable that 45% of all road traffic
offences were struck out in both 2011 and 2012.
Table 6 - District Court Orders excluding RTOs - 2008 to 2012
District Court Orders excluding RTOs - 2008 to 2012

* These

Year

Total Orders
Excluding RTOs

Listed Garda
Orders*

‘Other’
Category

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

192,323
187,897
185,107
188,268
167,677

117,744
115,431
114,579
114,495
98,909

74,579
72,466
70,528
73,773
68,768

are predominantly public order / assault; drugs; theft; and sexual offences.
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Table 7 graphs the number of orders in the ‘other’ category as a percentage of the total
number of orders (blue) and also as a percentage of the total number of orders excluding
RTOs (red).

Figure 7 – Percentage of District Court orders classified as “other”.
District Court Orders 2008-2012
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

% Total

13.5%

13.9%

14.1%

15.7%

17.2%

% Total excl. RTOs

38.8%

38.6%

38.1%

39.2%

41.0%
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4.3 The Expansion of Policing

4.3.1

The Growth of Irish Policing Providers

The questionnaire (Q.2, Q.11 and Q12) gathered details regarding three relevant time
periods in the lifespan of each organisation: the year it was established; the year it was
granted the power to prosecute; and the year when the first case was actually
prosecuted. Figure 8 graphs the year of establishment of the 51 policing organisations
clearly indicating that 31 (61%) were established post 1990.

Figure 8 – Policing Organisations - Year Established

The Emergence of new Policing Authorities

2020
Year Established

2000
1980

2010

31
1990

1990

20

1960
1940

49

46

43

40

37

34

31

28

25

22

19

16

13

10

7

4

1

1920
N=51

51 policing organisations in date order of establishment
Note: Organisations which pre-dated the origins of the State were graphed with a date of 1922.
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Figure 9 illustrates a comparison across the four respondents with the greatest time
period between the year established and the year of first prosecution.
Figure 9 – Date of Establishment v. Use of Prosecution Powers
Use of "Prosecution" Powers
2020
2013
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1980
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1949
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1940
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1930
1920

VCI

CSO

Dublin Bus

Organisation
Year Established

Year power to prosecute

DSP

N=4

Year first case prosecuted

Figure 10 illustrates a selection of ten organisations with the greatest time period
between the year a prosecution power was available to the organisation and the year it
was first used.
Figure 10 – Availability v. Use of Prosecution Powers
Prosecution Powers
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4.3.2

Reasons for Expansion

The questionnaire (Q.13) confirmed that An Garda Síochána had previously
investigated and prosecuted offences, or at least similar offences, that were now under
the responsibility of nine identified policing organisations. The LMS (NSAI)
commented that the power had been ‘civilianised’.

Also from question 13, 28

organisations stated that neither An Garda Síochána nor any other agency had
previously prosecuted similar offences that were now under their responsibility.
The documentary analysis of Oireachtas reports identified three possible reasons for an
expansion in the number of agencies. These were:
a) The imposition of EU Directives (PQ 27470/13).
b) Political distancing (PQ 26289/13 and PQ 19033/13).
c) Political calls for greater action including ‘increased prosecutions’ (Seanad
debates, 2 July 2013), ‘tougher inspections’ (PQ 27635/13) and ‘stronger
sanctions’ (Dáil debates, 29 May 2013).
4.4 Policing Activities

4.4.1

Level of Policing

The documentary analysis of Oireachtas reports indicated a variety of policing activities
carried on by these organisations. Table 7 presents a sample of this work.
Table 7 – Policing Activities
Organisation Actions
CRO
Struck off 38,284 companies between 2008 and 2013.
DSP
Interviewed almost 8,500 people at over 200 vehicle
checkpoints between 2010 and 2012.
FSAI
Implement over 10,000 inspections per annum for food
labelling legislation.
PRTB
Contacted over 43,000 unregistered landlords in 2012.
Revenue

Reference
PQ 31797/13
Dáil debates,
9 July 2013
PQ 14590/13

Dáil debates,
24 Jan 2013
537,000 compliance interventions, yielding a total of PQ 15094/13
€492 million for the exchequer.
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The criminal aspect of those dealt with by some organisations is very evident with lists
of firearms, bullets and offensive weapons seized (PQ 4149/13) and reports of physical
assaults on members of staff (PQ 32315/13).
The importance of the policing role of Irish state authorities was dramatically
showcased when the FSAI uncovered a European wide practice of mislabelling meat
products, which actually contained equine DNA or put simply, horsemeat. The
revelation generated an investigation, which has since expanded beyond Europe (Dáil
debates, 14 March 2013).

4.4.2

Use of Prosecution Powers

The research indicates that most policing authorities operate what the NTA referred to
as ‘a graduated approach’ (Dáil debates, 16 May 2013) whereby a range of alternative
options are considered before opting for the prosecution route. These include education,
preventative high visibility patrols, licensing, late filing charges, penalties, interest and
publication of names. An example of this is the acceptance of ‘compromise penalties’
by the Revenue Commissioners, which has resulted in approximately 80% of the annual
1,000 detections of the illegal use of marked mineral oil, being settled outside of the
formal criminal justice system (PQ 16805/13). Another example is the application of
late filing penalties by the CRO, which appears to have successfully reduced late filing
of company returns from 87% in 2001 to just 12% in 2010.
The primary research identified actual prosecution numbers for 37 organisations for
2011 (13,474 prosecutions) and 2012 (14,480 prosecutions). A detailed table listing
these prosecutions is included at Appendix D. In addition, the main, (although not all),
prosecution statistics for local authorities were also quantified. Firstly, a comprehensive
statistical report produced by the LGMA (2013), indicated that local authorities secured
527 prosecutions nationally under the litter Acts and another 676 prosecutions
nationally under planning enforcement. A separate report published by the DECLG
(2013) quantified the number of prosecutions under the Control of Dogs Acts at 133 for
2011.

Together the findings quantified the number of prosecutions by all 38

organisations to be approximately 15,000 prosecutions for 2011.
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However, the research also identified a number of organisations that have the power to
prosecute but do not or have had no cause to use such a power to date (Table 8).
Table 8 - Organisations with unused Prosecuting Powers
Organisation
An Coimisineir Teanga
Bord Gáis
Central Bank
Property Services Regulatory Authority
Railway Safety Commission
Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland

Details of the organisations which were responsible for the largest number of
prosecutions in 2012 are presented in Table 9.
Table 9 – 2012 Prosecutions
Organisation

2012

An Post
Office of the Revenue Commissioners
Data Protection Commissioner
Road Safety Authority
Iarnród Éireann
Dublin Bus

11,500
1,517
195
182
156
147

The research also identified that there were significant increases for some organisations
in the numbers of prosecutions between 2011 and 2012 (Table 10).
Table 10 – Prosecution increases 2011 v 2012
Organisation
Increase
Electricity Supply Board
Data Protection Commissioner
Dublin Bus
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority
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320%
261%
130%
117%

4.4.3

Networks

The documentary analysis indicated that organisations often work very closely with
others as part of their policing role. Examples of close cooperation with An Garda
Síochána (PQ 27635/13; PQ 32154/13; PQ 36688/13) and other agencies (PQ 16987/13;
PQ 18542/13; PQ 22804/13; Dáil debates, 11 June 2013; Dáil debates, 9 July 2013) are
well documented.

4.4.4

Crime Data

The primary research confirmed that no central list of prosecutors is held anywhere in
Ireland. The research also established that no crime data is specifically collected or
published for individual or collective groups of non-Garda organisations acting in a
policing role. Neither the CSO nor the Courts Service publishes individual statistics on
state policing organisations.
4.5 Summary
The chapter identified 51 organisations operating alongside An Garda Síochána and
clearly demonstrated the expansion of the number of such organisations over the last
two decades.

The structure, staffing levels and governance of these policing

organisations were analysed, highlighting that the majority of policing organisations
report into a government department. The chapter included an in-depth examination of
prosecution activity identifying prosecution statistics and trends, publication policies
and noting a greater preponderance to select the prosecution option as an enforcement
method, with long established organisations now prosecuting for the first time. The
research also highlighted that some organisations have the power to prosecute but do
not exercise such a power.

The existence of networks was also confirmed and

information was provided on level of visibility of these organisations in the Oireachtas
and in District court statistics.
The next chapter provides discussion on these findings.
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CHAPTER 5
5. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the findings and considers what the research reveals about
policing within the context of Irish state organisations. The chapter also highlights
where there is concurrence and disparity between the data collected and the current
literature.
5.2 Ireland’s Policing Authorities

5.2.1

Identification

The study succeeded in empirically mapping Irish state organisations operating in a
policing role. The research determined that this group of policing authorities is as
varied in organisational structure as it is in diversity of roles. The organisations include
a wide mixture of government departments, state sponsored commercial and noncommercial bodies, health authorities and regulatory bodies. This diversity concurs
with the literature, which referred to ‘a complex constellation of agencies’
(MacCarthaigh, 2010:20). A closer examination of the structures reveals that one of the
organisations listed is actually a private entity empowered to prosecute as the operator
of Ireland’s Luas transportation system. This entity, Transdev Ireland, operates the
Luas on behalf of the Railway Procurement Agency and in addition to fare evasion;
their security and compliance team are quite active in securing prosecutions for antisocial behaviour. Also, in a true example of transnational policing, the Loughs Agency,
being one of eight north/south bodies established under the Good Friday agreement,
prosecutes offenders in their country of residence regardless of whether the offence
occurred north or south of the Irish border.
The study has discovered six organisations that have the power to prosecute but which
have not exercised such a power.

In actual fact, there may be many more such

organisations but the only means of establishing the extent of such a group would be by
way of a comprehensive review of all Irish legislation, a possible topic for future
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research. The research also discovered that at least one organisation in Ireland operates
without prosecution powers while its equivalent in the United Kingdom is very active in
terms of prosecutions. The ISPCA is actively involved in investigations but then refers
cases on to An Garda Síochána who take responsibility for prosecutions. This contrasts
with the RSPCA, which is the second largest prosecuting authority in the U.K.; second
only to the Crown Prosecution Service itself (Rayner, 2013), with 1,552 individuals
convicted in 2012 (RSPCA Prosecutions Annual Report 2012).

5.2.2

State of Flux

An examination of the literature and the findings reveals that the collective group of
active policing organisations operating in the Irish state is subject to a state of constant
flux.

The research has identified a number of organisations, which prosecute

sporadically, for example, six of the organisations listed as prosecutors in Appendix D
did not take a prosecution in one or both of the years examined. In addition, the
literature indicates a possible decrease in policing activity with the merger of state
agencies and significant staff reductions throughout these organisations (Boyle, 2012;
MacCarthaigh, 2010; O'Toole and Dooney, 2009).
However, the research has confirmed that the Veterinary Council of Ireland, despite
being in existence since 1931, has only as recently as January 2013, prosecuted its first
case. It was also confirmed that Bord Gáis, although presently not a prosecutor, is in
the process of establishing a revenue protection unit and expects to commence
prosecutions in the near future. Likewise the enforcement units of the Central Bank and
the Property Services Regulatory Authority are very new, having been established in
2010 and it is expected that both of these organisations will invoke prosecution powers
at a future date. Both the literature and the primary research therefore indicate that this
policing group is subject to constant change. This may be a main contributing factor as
to why there is no central list of prosecuting organisations and why the literature
presents no comprehensive data on these organisations.

5.2.3

Regulatory Bodies

The research shows that Ireland has adapted the rule-at-a-distance concept applauded by
Eisner, (2000) and has enthusiastically embraced the world of regulatory governance.
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The study found that regulators accounted for 47% (18 of 39) of the respondents. This
is very much in keeping with other countries and is in line with Braithwaite’s (2000)
declaration of the existence of a ‘New Regulatory State’. As the state retains control
with the majority of prosecuting organisations reporting into a government department
it would seem that for Ireland, regulation does actually strengthen the state as acclaimed
throughout the literature (Shearing and Berg, 2006; Zedner, 2004).

5.2.4

Visibility

It is significant that only 25 of the 51 identified policing organisations received a
mention in Oireachtas reports in relation to their prosecuting role.

This statistic

identifies the lack of visibility of this group and prompts the question as to why
organisations were not mentioned in such a capacity. Is it simply that there has been no
question regarding their enforcement roles or alternatively that there is little knowledge
of the prosecutions undertaken by their organisations.
This lack of acknowledgement of the work of these organisations is equally evident in
the statistics produced by the District court. Despite the fact that these 51 policing
organisations are part of a category that now accounts for 17.2% of all District Court
orders (or over 40% percent when road traffic offences are excluded), they still do not
merit a category of their own. As a result there are no separate District court statistics
which display the prosecution work of these organisations. In this respect, Ireland is no
different to others and seems to concur, rather unfortunately, with Newburn’s
(2001:834) description of the UK equivalents as being ‘longstanding, if usually ignored,
components of local policing structures.’
5.3 The Expansion of Plural Policing

5.3.1

The Growth of Irish Policing Providers

The research clearly demonstrates an expansion in the number of policing organisations
and reveals that Ireland is in keeping with other countries in terms of overall change and
increased plural policing. The transformation represents an increased fragmentation of
policing and is in line with the dominant discourse which ‘privileges change over
continuity” (Newburn, 2001:844).
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The study revealed that 31 (61%) of the identified prosecuting organisations were
established post 1990 and this concurs with the findings of Hardiman and Scott (2010)
regarding a dramatic increase in the number of state organisations but more importantly
supports the earlier study by McGauran, Verhoest and Humphreys (2005), which
estimated that over 60% of all national agencies were established post 1990. The high
number of agencies could well be considered an example of Giddens (1990) warning
that the momentum of change was so great that it reflected ‘a runaway world’.
Alternatively, this rapid change may have simply been an increased awareness of the
need for additional specialised policing organisations.
The expansion and diversity of state policing providers identified by the research
certainly conforms to McLaughlin’s (2007) declaration regarding nodal governance that
‘as you move through different space, you are governed by different sets of state and
non-state agencies’. This research has empirically mapped the Irish state agencies that
occupy some of the space referred to by McLaughlin (2007). This increase would also
appear to be an example of the state reaction to pluralism, described by Bauman (1999)
as a flexing of muscles and by Garland (2001) as an act of an act of denial. Indeed, it
might be apt to ask if the findings of the research are evidence of Garland’s (2001)
theory of a culture of control. The expansion in Ireland’s policing organisations would
seem to support his claims that increasing numbers within society were being placed
under the supervision of the justice system.
A closer examination of the research findings reveals that the expansion of
organisations into the field of prosecution is an even more recent event than first
considered. A more accurate approach to identifying the arrival of a new prosecuting
(and by definition policing) authorities is to map out, not the year established, but rather
the year in which the power to prosecute was granted or even more appropriate the year
of the first prosecution.

Both of these are a more accurate indicator of active

involvement in plural policing. This point is illustrated in the research by a comparison
of the four respondents with the greatest time period between the year established and
the year of first prosecution. While the organisations were formed between 1931 and
1952, the first prosecutions were not taken until 1978, 1993, 1996 and 2013. This shows
that a number of organisations which were established pre-1990 have actually only
entered the world of plural policing quite recently.
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While there is clear evidence of an expansion of the number of policing organisations,
the research also reveals an expansion of policing within organisations.

The PQ

7979/13 demonstrates that large numbers of Irish citizens are now routinely policed by
state organisations.

It discloses that the number of interventions by the Revenue

Commissioners has increased from 189,690 in 2006 to 537,822 in 2012 but that the
associated monetary yield actually decreased from €691m in 2006 to €492m in 2012.
This would appear to be a perfect example of Shearing’s (2001) prediction that there
would be a wider net catching smaller fish. But policing here is extended not outside
the state as predicted, but rather across to other state officials.

5.3.2

Reasons for Expansion

The research concurs with the literature in part, identifying EU directives as one
possible reason for the expansion of policing (MacCarthaigh, 2010; O'Toole and
Dooney, 2009). However, there is no evidence of a lack of funding or a loss of faith in
the police or criminal justice system as possible reasons for a transfer of traditional
policing roles to new immerging organisations. While the research clearly shows a
transfer of tasking from An Garda Síochána to other policing organisations, it may
simply be that the Irish state and its agencies have evolved to address the growing
diversity of crime.

This is evidenced by the fact that 28 organisations (74% of

respondents) stated that neither An Garda Síochána nor any other agency had previously
prosecuted similar offences that were now under their responsibility. This is clear
evidence of additional criminal legislation and increased offences. It would seem that
for Ireland the welfare state is truly over and society is becoming more punitive. This
concurs with Braithwaite (2000) but conflicts with the findings of Kilcommins et al.,
(2004) and Hamilton (2013) that Ireland has resisted punitive trends.
5.4 Policing Activities

5.4.1

Use of Prosecution Powers

The expansion of policing organisations in Ireland has resulted in a blurring of
traditional roles whereby, at least to date, An Garda Síochána have been joined by an
ever increasing number of investigators and prosecutors who no longer rely on
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compliance, regulations and civil procedures as the only enforcement options available.
The research has shown that Irish policing organisations use various approaches to
regulation including the co-operative, compliance-negotiation and the criminal coercive
models. The findings clearly demonstrate that both deterrence-based law enforcement
and compliance-based law enforcement are utilised throughout these organisations.
However the literature indicates that compliance-based law enforcement agencies such
as regulators, avoid formal prosecutions, as this option is viewed as a sign of failure of
the system (Zedner, 2004). The findings of the research do not support this theory. It is
accurate to state that these policing organisations make full use of other enforcement but
there is no evidence that they avoid prosecutions for fear of being seen as a failure,
rather prosecution is used when and where necessary, with different organisations
placing different values on the merit of prosecutions. In fact, the research has indicated
that there is an increased alignment between regulatory law and criminal law as
evidenced by the wide number of regulatory bodies, which undertake prosecutions.
An analysis of the prosecutions reveals that there was a 7% increase in the number of
prosecutions between 2011 and 2012. However, this is entirely due to the increase in
prosecution numbers for An Post, which recorded an increase of 1,000 or 10% on the
previous year. Also, while there is a certain consistency across the years regarding the
top ten prosecutors (in numerical terms) with eight of the top ten being present for both
2011 and 2012, there was no overall single trend in terms of prosecution numbers.
Indeed the primary research shows that of the 37 organisations where prosecution
statistics were identified, the numbers of prosecutions, comparing 2011 with 2012,
increased in 12 organisations, decreased in 18 others while seven recorded no change.
The research reveals that in modern day Ireland, leaving aside criminal offences dealt
with by An Garda Síochána, the most prosecuted offences, in numerical order, in the
Republic of Ireland are failure to pay a television licence, failure to file a tax return,
littering, breach of planning permission and fare evasion on public transportation. It is
notable that four organisations operating in the commercial world accounted for only
10% of respondents but that three of the four were in the top six positions in terms of
prosecution numbers. On these facts it might appear that commercial bodies, with an
obvious primary requirement to protect revenue are more prone to opt for prosecution as
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a deterrent.

Alternatively, the prosecution option may also be the most effective

deterrent available given the particular nature of each business.
It is very significant that almost 13,500 of the estimated 15,000 prosecutions in 2011
were generated from just three organisations (An Post, local authorities and the Revenue
Commissioners). However, the quantity of prosecutions is only a broad indicator of
policing activity and is not a true indicator of worth. For example, a prosecution for non
payment of a television licence or the non filing of an income tax return does not equate
to a prosecution by the HSA for loss of life or limb.

5.4.2

Networks

The primary research provides evidence of networked or nodal governance as it
identifies that organisations frequently interact across a system of networks. In addition
to working closely with An Garda Síochána, the research findings show that a number
of organisations were active participants in a wide variety of networks. These networks
could be broadly divided into:
a) Operational Networks: These included ‘multi-agency vehicle checks’ with An Garda
Síochána, DSP and the Revenue Commissioners, and also joint investigations between
the DSP, the Revenue Commissioners and the Taxi Regulator.

These operational

networks also operate at an international level where two cross-border groups dedicated
to tobacco and fuel fraud enforcement bring together police and Revenue staff from
both sides of the Irish border.
b) Information Networks: The primary research identified references to a ‘real time data
link-up’ between the NTA, Revenue and DSP and also to a formal ‘exchange of
information’ between the PRTB, DSP, Revenue and local authorities.
c) National level Enforcement: Two significant national level networks identified
include the ‘Environmental Enforcement Network’ which is coordinated by the EPA
and includes, multiple agencies from both sides of the Irish border, and the FSAI which
has overall responsibility for food safety in Ireland and which enforces food labelling
regulations through service contracts with a multitude of other policing agencies.
d) Cross Sector Networks: Two networks which extend beyond the state comprise an
expert advisory committee for the protection of national heritage which includes the
DAHG and a second network entitled the ‘Hidden Economy Monitoring Group’ which
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is chaired by the Revenue Commissioners and which includes representatives from
Government Departments, agencies, trade unions, and employer and business
organisations.

This second network is a clear example of anchored pluralism as

promoted by Loader and Walker (2007). Here, the network is populated by a variety of
factions from across society but the state occupies a pivotal position within the network.
However, it is notable that the majority of networks involved only state policing
agencies with no participation from beyond the state. This concurs with Newburn
(2001:834), who described the UK state policing equivalents as sitting outside of local
security networks linked only in ‘the loosest sense to many other policing bodies’.

5.4.3

Crime Data

The primary research has identified 51 policing organisations, in addition to An Garda
Síochána, actively prosecuting cases in Ireland. However, there is no central list of
these prosecutors held anywhere in Ireland. The CSSO, the DPP, the Courts Service of
Ireland, the Central Statistics Office nor the Department of Justice and Equality (DJE)
maintain such list.

Equally there is no easily accessible statistical report on the

prosecution activity of these policing organisations.

An examination of available

statistics demonstrates that these statistics are more misleading than helpful.

For

example, the Central Statistics Office published ‘recorded crime incidents’ for 2011,
includes statistics on litter offences (19 convictions); dog offences (56 convictions); and
rail travel offences (7 convictions), all under the heading of ‘Garda Recorded Crime
Statistics’. However, the equivalent statistics for the policing organisations of the local
authorities and Iarnród Éireann, which are not published by the CSO, were 527, 133 and
170 convictions respectively. The irrelevance of the published CSO figures is obvious.
Equally an analysis of the annual reports and statistics produced by the Courts Service
reveals that other policing providers are reported in a single catch all category entitled
‘other’. This category is a mixture of prosecutions by An Garda Síochána and other
organisations and officially includes ‘offences such as breach of bail, litter offences,
street trading and offences prosecuted by government departments and other state
agencies such as the Health and Safety Authority’. A review of the last five years
clearly demonstrates that the percentage of prosecutions credited to this category in
comparison to overall court business has increased almost every year and this group
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represents a significant amount of court time. However, it is not possible to separate the
number of prosecutions initiated by An Garda Síochána from those of other agencies
and as such the statistical output from this category is quite limited.
The reality is that, in order to allow policy makers to make an informed decision it is
important that they are aware of the facts. However the primary research provides
evidence that there is an information deficit with regard to statistical reports on the
prosecution activities of identified policing organisations and the literature similarly
suggests that this information deficit exists across all aspects of crime statistics.

5.4.4

Transparency

The literature raised concerns regarding legitimacy, accountability and fairness (Loader
and Walker, 2007; Reiner, 2010), and predicted potential injustices from divergent
policies (Zedner, 2004). The research findings have indicated that these concerns may
have merit, as there appears to be a lack of transparency in a number of policing
organisations. It is significant that ten of the 39 respondents (24%) actively chose not to
publicise the number of prosecution staff within the organisation and that three
respondents actively decided not to comment on the existence or otherwise of a
centrally located criminal prosecution unit. The analysis of the Oireachtas debates also
includes examples of where organisations have refused to reveal the number of staff
allocated to certain enforcement type roles. There may be good operational reasons for
not revealing, for example, the number of inspectors allocated to a particular role or
location but as a general rule government funded organisations should promote
transparency.

A non-disclosure regarding Garda numbers assigned to a particular

division or city would not be acceptable and the same rules of transparency must apply
to their policing colleagues in other agencies.
In a similar context the primary research identified that there was a wide divergence
regarding the publication of prosecution policies. While a number of very detailed
prosecution policies are easily accessible, for example, Central Bank, DSP, EPA,
Revenue Commissioners, there are equally as many organisations which have no
published policy regarding prosecution. The research findings show that Irish policing
organisations are in conflict with the advice of Loader and Walker (2007) who opined
that in order for the state to be treated as the centre anchor within a pluralised policing
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world the state must itself be civilized. The literature very clearly highlights that the
legitimacy of any organisation depends on a perceived fairness of procedural justice
(Tyler, 1990 & 2003).

5.4.5

Publication Policy

The research discovered that there appears to be a rather arbitrary approach to
publishing the personal details of individual cases found guilty of an offence. The
research discovered that seven organisations publish the details of all cases, 13 publish
selected cases and 18 do not publish any details. For example, the DECLG do not
publish the names of those prosecuted for illegal dumping due to data protection issues
(PQ 18745/13). The result is that the personal details of those found guilty of certain
offences will be published while others will not. The dangers of labelling and the
potential unplanned effect of actually increasing deviance are well documented in
criminological literature and the importance of such a decision merits a strategic policy
with a considered response for each case.
In a similar context, policing organisations take different approaches to offenders who
received the Probation Act.

Some organisations, for example the HSA, name the

individual and present all of the case details while other organisations, such as, the EPA,
have a policy of not publishing the details of such cases.
5.5 Summary
The primary research has highlighted the complexity of the policing bodies in the state,
identifying a diverse range of organisations involved in policing in Ireland in 2013. The
research has verified that plural policing is expanding in Ireland and this is in line with
other countries. The primary research discovered evidence of networked or nodal
governance and the expansion of regulatory governance.

While the number of

organisations involved in prosecutions is increasing, there was no overall single trend in
terms of actual prosecution numbers. Concerns have been raised regarding limitations
of available crime data, a possible lack of transparency and also what appears to be an
adhoc approach to publication.
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CHAPTER 6
6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Conclusions
This thesis sought to explore the various state policing organisations in existence in
2013 in Ireland, in addition to An Garda Síochána and to produce a comprehensive
empirical mapping of these governance entities. Policing organisations were defined as
only those organisations operating in a coercive manner at the most extreme end of the
social control spectrum, that is, state directed organisations that actively prosecuted
cases in the Irish courts. The research identified 51 such organisations each operating in
their own area of expertise but together forming a security governance of state
appointed nodes.

The research ascertained that the number of these policing

organisations have increased significantly over the last two decades. The research
clearly showed that this group of policing providers is subject to constant change with
long established organisations now prosecuting for the first time, while other agencies
are subject to merger or closure, as the government’s plans for the rationalisation of
state agencies develops.
The research identified the use of both deterrence-based and compliance-based law
enforcement and confirmed that the prosecution option is commonly used throughout
many of these organisations. The study has shown that the Irish state has technically
withdrawn from front-line policing in specific areas, opting for indirect rule by
appointing regulators to police selected ring-fenced activities. However, as almost all
policing organisations report into a designated government department, the state
actually retains a high level of control. The research has also shown that many policing
organisations are actively involved in a variety of networks with evidence that a form of
state anchored pluralism is in existence. It is very apparent that plural policing not only
exists but also thrives within state appointed policing organisations.
This research was unique in that it was the first time that organisations performing a
policing role on behalf of the state have been empirically mapped in Ireland. The
literature on the topic is weakly developed and this study has made a contribution to the
understanding of the subject by identifying and highlighting a multitude of state
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appointed organisations acting in a police type role. While the thesis focussed on the
Irish state and has an obvious national level interest, the results have a wider application
and could contribute internationally as other jurisdictions would benefit from a similar
empirical mapping exercise.
The distinct contribution of this research includes:
1. A nationwide analysis of state policing entities.
2. The documentation of plural policing within the wider public sector.
3. The identification and analysis of the policing activities of these organisations,
in particular the use of prosecutions.
4. The analysis and confirmation of the governance of the policing organisations.
6.2 Recommendations
It is recommended that a planned and strategic approach be developed to maximise the
performance of policing organisations within the state. This strategy may include one
or more of the specific recommendations listed below.

Shared Services:
The state’s whole-of-government approach, with an emphasis on cost-saving
innovations, is actively promoting a policy of shared services. However, to date this
initiative has concentrated on such areas as human resources and information
technology services. Consideration should be given to exploring the possibility of a
shared investigation, prosecution and/or legal service, especially for smaller agencies
where the sanction of prosecutions is infrequently applied.

Performance Measurement:
It is recommended that the government explore the possibility of extending the
performance measurement portal ‘Ireland Stat’ to include a comparison of policing
performances across various entities within the state. The comparisons of programme
and policy outcomes across state policing organisations should identify best practice
and inform cost benefit analysis.
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Experiential Learning:
Organisations which operate in a policing role should have an opportunity to discuss
similar policy issues such as crime prevention, crime reduction, effective and efficient
compliance and enforcement measures with the goal of experiential learning from their
counterparts. Central government policy makers should consider the establishment of a
relevant network, conference or seminar to achieve this sharing of knowledge.

Transparent Prosecution Policy:
Transparency and accountability are essential elements of any state organisation.
Equally the legitimacy of every organisation is dependent on the acceptance of society
that procedures are fair and transparent. It is recommended that every organisation,
which has the power to prosecute, should publish a clearly defined prosecution policy
with clear rules of outlining the circumstances as to when a prosecution is likely to be
pursued.

Crime statistics:
The limitations of available crime data was very evident throughout this study and it is
highly recommended that a central organisation, such as the Department of Justice and
Equality or the Central Statistics Office take responsibility for the collection and
publication of crime data to include relevant crime statistics for all policing entities. On
a related theme, this central unit should agree and co-ordinate a set of counting rules
with regard to crimes and prosecutions for each policing organisation, similar to that in
place for An Garda Síochána.

Simultaneously, consideration should be given to

enhancing the Criminal Case Tracking System presently used by the Courts Service to
track individual cases. The availability of meaningful comprehensive crime data will
assist policy makers in making an informed decision.
6.3 The Future
Each of the organisations identified could be researched in greater depth to further
examine, for example, governance structures, participation in networks or impact of
plural policing. Alternatively research into state organisations that have the power to
prosecute but that have not exercised such a power would prove beneficial. The fact
remains that the concept of plural policing across state organisations is underdeveloped
and it is an area that would benefit from further criminological research and analysis.
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APPENDIX A – Introductory Letter
Thomas Talbot,
Revenue Commissioners,
1st Floor, Block D,
Ashtowngate,
Dublin 15.
July 2013
Re: Information Request
I am writing to you to seek your assistance in obtaining some general information
regarding “prosecutions” taken by your organisation.
I am completing a Masters of Arts in Criminology in the Dublin Institute of
Technology. My dissertation is based on what is termed “plural policing” with a
specific focus on non-Garda criminal prosecutions. Obviously, An Garda Síochána,
acting as the single Irish State police force, is the lead law enforcement agency within
the State. However, the Garda role is supplemented by an increasing number of
government organisations pro-actively “policing” their own particular area of
responsibility. The aim of my dissertation is to identify these organisations and
highlight the “policing role” they undertake.
To date, I have found in excess of 60 Irish State agencies, authorities, boards,
commissions, government departments, institutes, offices, regulators and societies, all
of which appear to have taken a prosecution case through the Irish Courts for breach of
the legislation/regulations under their care.
I am very aware that the prosecution avenue is only one of a number of enforcement
options and in many cases it is only used as a last resort or in the most serious of cases.
While I am using the specific use of “prosecution” to identify the entities that perform a
“policing” role it is my intention to make reference to the many other compliance
actions taken: warnings, penalties, confiscations, closure orders etc. By noting the
number and type of breaches identified together with the types of corrective actions
taken, I propose to show that prosecutions are but one of many options used by State
organisations.
As someone who has spent a number of years in the Investigations and Prosecutions
Division of the Revenue Commissioners, I appreciate that prosecuting an offending
party can be a quite onerous and resource intensive task, which requires dedication and
meticulous attention to detail. As such one of the aims of my dissertation is to shine a
light on the work of the multitude of “prosecutors” across all organisations in the State.
The intention is not to compare individual organisations with each other but rather to
quantify the prosecution work undertaken and achieved by government agencies as a
whole. In simple terms, my goal is to ensure all entities are listed and credited with the
work they have done to date.
I intend to quantify the number of prosecutions completed in 2011 or alternatively 2012
if a sufficient number of 2012 annual reports have been completed and published. My
aim is then to compare the number of prosecutions and prosecuting bodies with a point
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in history, possibly 1991 or 1992 when I suspect there were only a limited number of
organisations outside of An Garda Síochána that processed their own prosecution cases.
While I am only seeking general information and only information that is already in the
public domain, I wish to emphasise that my dissertation will be completed strictly in
accordance with the relevant code of ethics: in this case, the ethical codes of both D.I.T.
and the Sociological Association of Ireland:
http://www.dit.ie/researchandenterprise/researchatdit/ethicsindit/content/guidelines/
http://www.sociology.ie/docstore/dls/pages_list/3_sai_ethical_guidelines.pdf
In order to ensure I have the correct information regarding your organisation, I would
very much appreciate if you could assist me by:
1. Completing the questionnaire attached.
2. Forwarding on a hard copy of your annual reports for 2011 and 2012 if copies are
available.
3. If you have a formal “prosecution policy”, by indicating the location of this
information on your website.
I appreciate that we are heading for the month of August and that a number of key
personnel may be on annual leave. Unfortunately I am on a very tight deadline to
complete this dissertation and I would ask therefore, if at all possible, that the material
be supplied at your earliest convenience. Please feel free to contact me if you wish to
discuss further or if you have any questions about any aspect of this request.
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance in this matter.
Yours Sincerely,
_________________
Thomas Talbot
Telephone number:
Mobile telephone no:
E-mail address:
ttalbot@revenue.ie
Fax number:
01-8277228
Address:
As above
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APPENDIX B – Questionnaire

Questionnaire
A. Organisation:
Q. 1.

What is the formal title of your organisation1?
______________________________________

Q. 2.

In what year was your organisation first established?
Year: __ __ __ __
Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification)
_____________________________________________________________________

Q. 3.

Has your organisation ever undergone a change of name since it was first established?
Yes

No

If yes please list previous name(s)__________________________________________
Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification)
_____________________________________________________________________
Q. 4.

What structure best describes your organisation?
Government Department
[If Gov. Dept. skip Q.5.]

State sponsored body: Commercial

Regulatory Body

State sponsored body: Non-Commercial

Local Authority

Other (Pease specify: ______________)

Q. 5. Does your organisation report into a designated government department?
Yes

No

If yes please identify “parent” department: ___________________________________
Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification)
_____________________________________________________________________
Q. 6. How large is your organisation in terms of staffing?
The approximate number of individual staff, regardless of work pattern, (Not FTEs2)
for the entire organisation at 01/01/2013 was:

1

2

1-24

25-49

250-500

501-1,000

50-99
1001-2,499

For this questionnaire the word “organisation” refers to an Irish State Agency; Authority; Board; Commission;
Government Department; Institute; Office; Regulator; Society or similar entity.
The definition of a Full Time Equivalent (FTE) is one employee working full-time.

71

100-249
>2,500

B. Prosecutions - General:
Q. 7. Is it possible for your organisation to quantify the number of staff who are dedicated
solely to criminal prosecution work?
Yes

No

Would prefer not to advertise exact numbers

If yes, what number of individual staff, regardless of work pattern, (Not FTEs2) was
dedicated solely to criminal prosecution work as at 01/01/2013.
0

1-4

5-9

10-19

20-49

50-99

>100

Q. 8. Does your organisation have a dedicated centrally located Criminal Prosecution Unit3?
Yes

No

Would prefer not to comment

If yes please give details: ________________________________________________
Q. 9. Does your organisation have access to advice from a “legal” team to assist in
processing criminal prosecution cases? (Tick all that apply)
Yes – Internal legal team available
Yes – Legal advice is received from external legal advisors

(specify: __________)

No legal advice is sought for prosecution cases
Q. 10.

Does your organisation have delegated authority i.e. the power to prosecute summarily
without reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P.)?
Yes

No

Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification)
_____________________________________________________________________
Q. 11. In what year was legislation passed which first granted your organisation the power to
initiate a prosecution of any kind against an offender? 4
Year: __ __ __ __
Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification)
_____________________________________________________________________
Q. 12.

In what year was the first case actually prosecuted for a breach of legislation /
regulations?
Year: __ __ __ __
Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification)
_____________________________________________________________________

3
4

A centrally located unit is one with responsibility for specific prosecutions across the entire organisation.
It is noted that most summary prosecutions and all indictable prosecutions are authorised by, and brought in the
name of, the DPP.
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Q. 13. Did An Garda Síochána previously prosecute similar offences before legislation was
passed to enable your organisation to initiate prosecutions on its own behalf? 4
Yes

No

Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification)
_____________________________________________________________________
Q. 14. Was the power to initiate prosecutions for certain offences granted to your organisation: 4
(Tick all that apply)
Automatically on establishment of the organisation
Following a request from your organisation
Other – (Please specify) ____________________________
Please elaborate on the background to the granting of prosecution powers:
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
Q. 15. Does your organisation make use of other enforcement/compliance options as well as
the prosecution option? (Tick all that apply)
Formal Warnings5

Approximate number of cases in 2011*

Monetary Penalties

Approximate number of cases in 2011*

Confiscations/Seizures

Approximate number of cases in 2011*

Closure orders

Approximate number of cases in 2011*

Other Options

Approximate number of cases in 2011*
(2011* - Leave blank if unsure or
statistics are not readily available)

Other Options =________________
_____________________________
(Please specify type and approx. number)

C. Prosecutions - Statistics:
Q. 16. Does your organisation publish prosecution statistics (actual numbers) on your website?
Yes

No

If yes, please copy link to web page: ___________________________________
Q. 17. Does your organisation publish details of prosecution cases on your website?
Yes - All cases

Yes - Selected cases

If yes, please copy link to web page: ___________________________________
5

Formal warnings are only those warnings which were documented and recorded in official statistics
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No

Q. 18. How many cases were prosecuted in 2011 by your organisation? 4
(Indicate only one of the following)
Total number prosecuted6

(Enter number if one or more cases prosecuted)

Nil - No cases in this year
Unable to quantify at this time
Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification or if your organisation uses a different
definition or means of counting prosecution cases in your statistics to that described at footnote 6)
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Q. 19. How many cases were prosecuted in 2012 by your organisation? 4
(Indicate only one of the following)
Total number prosecuted6

(Enter number if one or more cases prosecuted)

Nil - No cases in this year
Unable to quantify at this time
Comment: (if considered necessary for clarification or if your organisation uses a different
definition or means of counting prosecution cases in your statistics to that described at footnote 6)
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Q. 20. Please list a sample of the three most common offences, which are prosecuted by your
organisation? 4
1. _________________________________________
2. _________________________________________
3. _________________________________________
Q. 21. Please comment generally on the importance and/or relevance, or otherwise, of criminal
prosecutions as an enforcement option to your organisation.
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Q. 22. Is there any particular prosecution case or aspect of your prosecution programme, which
you would like to highlight, which has not been covered by earlier questions?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Q. 23. Contact Person:
The name of a person in the organisation who can be contacted regarding the material in
this questionnaire is Name: _______________________
Telephone number: _____________
E-mail address: ________________

6

The number of cases prosecuted includes both summary and indictable convictions within the year in question.
It does not include cases where the probation Act was applied.
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APPENDIX C – Specific topics mentioned in the Oireachtas (Jan to Jul 2013)
Organisation

Topic

J

F

M

A

M

J

J

An Post

TV Licence

1

Central Bank

Banking Crisis / Investigations

4

3

7

Central Bank

Central Bank Bill 2011

1

2

3

Central Bank

Corporate Governance

CRO

Company Law Issues

CRO

Company Registrations

DAFM

Animal Health & Welfare Bill 2012

DAFM

Animal Welfare/Disease Issues

DAFM

Food Labelling

DAFM

Horse Related Issues

DAFM

Single Payment Scheme

DAFM

Tree Felling

DAHG

Sites & National monuments

DAHG

Wildlife Protection

DCENR

New EU Directive

DOH

Sun bed Regulations

DSP

Departmental Schemes

DSP

DSP Checkpoints

1

1

DSP

Fraud Costs

1

1

DSP

Revenue Commissioners - Frauds

DSP

Social Welfare Bills 2012/2013

DSP

Staffing Matters

DSP

Taxi Regulation Bill 2012

EPA

Environmental Regulations

EPA

EPA Governance

1

EPA

Illegal Dumping

1

EPA

Waste Water Treatment

FSAI

Food Labelling

FSAI

Horse Meat Investigation

GSOC

1

1

1

1

1
1
1
2
5

3

1

4

1

1

14
1
1

1
1
2

6
1

1

1

1
2

1

1
3

Total

1

2
5

2

1

1
1
1

1
2

1

2

2
1

1

4

2
1

1

1
2

1

1

1

2

1
1

1
1

1

4

1

2
1

1
1

3

Delays in Receipt of Information

1

1

GSOC

Operation of GSOC

1

1

HSE

Child Care

2

HSE

EPA Governance

HSE

Food Labelling

HSE

Public Health Tobacco Bill 2013

1

HSE

Tobacco Control Measures

1

IFI

EPA Governance

1

IMB

Prescription Medicines

LMS (NSAI)

Food Labelling

Local Authorities

Air Pollution

Local Authorities

Carbon Tax Collection

Local Authorities

Environmental Regulations

1

1

5

16
1

1

1

1

1
2

1

1
1
1
1

1

2
1

1
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9

1

2

1

1
1

Organisation

Topic

J

F

M

A

M

J

J

Local Authorities

EPA Governance

1

Local Authorities

Food Labelling

Local Authorities

Housing

Local Authorities

Illegal Dumping

Local Authorities

Litter Pollution

1

1

Local Authorities

Waste Management Issues

1

1

NERA

Employment Rights

NERA

Revenue Commissioners Frauds

NERA

School Building Projects

NTA

Social Welfare Bills 2012/2013

1

NTA

Taxi Regulation Bill 2012

1

NTCO

Tobacco Control Measures

1

ODCE

Banking Crisis / Investigations

ODCE

Corporate Governance

1

1

ODCE

HMV Vouchers

1

1

PRTB

Anti-Social Behaviour

PRTB

PRTB Tenancy Registration

PRTB

Residential Tenancies Bill 2012

1

1

PSA

Role of the PSA

1

1

PSI

Pharmacy Regulations

1

1

Revenue

Carbon Tax Collection

Revenue

Customs Seizures / Funding

Revenue

Fuel Fraud

Revenue

Prescription Medicines

Revenue

Public Health Tobacco Bill 2013

1

Revenue

Social Welfare Bills 2012/2013

2

Revenue

Staffing Matters

Revenue

Tobacco Fraud

Revenue

Accountability

Revenue

DSP Checkpoints

Revenue

Environmental Regulations

Revenue

EPA Governance

1

1

Revenue

Liquor Licensing Laws

1

1

Revenue

Local Property Tax

1

1

Revenue

PRTB Tenancy Registration

Revenue

Tax Avoidance / Compliance

Revenue

Taxi Regulation Bill 2012

SFPA

Fisheries Offences

SFPA

Fisheries Protection

SFPA

Food Labelling

1
1

1
1
1

1

1

4

2
2

1

1

2

2

1
1

2

6

1

2
4

8

2

2

1

1

2

2
1

1

2

2

1

1

3

2

4

3

1

2

2

4

2

4

1

2
1

1

1

1

1

3

6

1

1
1

1
1
26

1
1

1
25

1
1

1

1

15
1

1

76

9
1

2

34

12

1

1

Total

3
1

1
2

5

2

2

2

Total

17

34

31

42

209

APPENDIX D - The number of cases prosecuted* in 2011 and 2012.
Organisation
2012
2011 % change
An Post
11,500 10,500
10%
Office of the Revenue Commissioners**
1,517 1,626
-7%
Data Protection Commissioner
195
54
261%
166
10%
Road Safety Authority
182
Companies Registration Office*
179
98
83%
Iarnród Éireann
156
170
-8%
Dublin Bus
147
64
130%
194
-34%
Department of Social Protection
128
Inland Fisheries Ireland
96
185
-48%
National Employment Rights Authority
70
56
25%
National Transport Authority
57
78
-27%
75
-35%
National Education Welfare Board
49
Electricity Supply Board
42
10
320%
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority**
26
12
117%
National Tobacco Control Office (Health Service Executive)
23
23
0%
31
-42%
Health and Safety Authority
18
Environmental Protection Agency
17
23
-26%
Pensions Board
15
26
-42%
12
5
140%
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland*
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine
10
6
67%
Irish Medicines Board
9
9
0%
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission**
5
4
25%
14
-71%
Private Residential Tenancies Board
4
Private Security Authority
4
10
-60%
Central Statistics Office
4
7
-43%
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement
4
5
-20%
11
-73%
Pensions Ombudsman
3
NPWS - Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht
3
5
-40%
Commission for Energy Regulation
2
0
100%
National Consumer Agency
1
2
-50%
Competition Authority
1
1
0%
NSAI Legal Metrology Service
1
1
0%
Food Safety Authority of Ireland
0
2
-100%
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland
0
1
-100%
Commission for Aviation Regulation
0
0
Veterinary Council of Ireland
0
0
National Milk Agency
0
0
14,480 13,474
7%
 This is a list of 37 of the 51 prosecuting agencies where it was possible to identify prosecution numbers.
 Taking note of the various counting rules applied by different organisations, the figures above should
be regarded as a broad indicator only of the number of prosecutions completed in 2011 and 2012.
 It should be emphasised that prosecution numbers represent only one element of the compliance /
enforcement work engaged in by the organisations listed above.
* This information was retrieved by way of official publications.
** Investigations are referred to and prosecuted in the name of the DPP.
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APPENDIX E – Reference List of Dáil and Seanad Éireann Debates
Dáil Debates
Dáil Debates, 24 January 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Residential Tenancies (Amendment)
(No. 2) Bill 2012: Second Stage (Resumed).
Dáil Debates, 14 March 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Interim Report on Equine DNAMislabelling of Processed Meat: Statements.
Dáil Debates, 2 May 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Other Questions Garda Síochána
Ombudsman Commission.
Dáil Debates, 16 May 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Taxi Regulation Bill 2012 [Seanad]:
Second Stage.
Dáil Debates, 29 May 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Topical Issue Debate Crèche
Inspections.
Dáil Debates, 11 June 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Social Welfare and Pensions
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2013: Committee Stage.
Dáil Debates, 9 July 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Other Questions - Social Welfare Fraud.

Seanad Debates
Seanad Éireann Debate, 2 July 2013. www.oireachtas.ie Central Bank (Supervision and
Enforcement) Bill 2011: Report and Final Stages.
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APPENDIX F – Reference List of Parliamentary Questions
Parliamentary Questions 1808/13, 16 January 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 3705/13, 29 January 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 4149/13, 29 January 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 7979/13, 14 February 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 14590/13, 26 March 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 15094/13, 26 March 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 16987/13, 16 April 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 18542/13, 23 April 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 19033/13, 23 April 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 22804/13, 14 May 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 26289/13, 30 May 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 27470/13, 11 June 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 27635/13, 11 June 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 31797/13, 2 July 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 32154/13, 2 July 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
Parliamentary Questions 36688/13, 18 July 2013. www.kildarestreet.com.
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